Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal
Equality by Boyle, Christine & Noonan, Sheila
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 6 
9-1-1956 





Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christine Boyle and Sheila Noonan, "Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal Equality" (1956) 10:2 
Dal LJ 225. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 






Both issues that are the subject of this paper raise questions relat-
ing to the meaning and application of section 15 of the Canadian Char-
ter ofRights and Freedoms.' They provide case studies of the difficulties
in putting an abstract concept, such as equality, into practical legal
effect.
The history of the law of prostitution, discussed by Christine
Boyle, provides strikingly different images of the legal construction
of male and female criminality. An examination of the most recent
law on this subject reveals some rejection, at least on the surface, of
these images and a commitment to the value of gender-neutrality. The
complex subject of pornography, addressed by Sheila Noonan, pro-
vides a contrast on a superficial legal level. The law of obscenity never
* Of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. We would like to thank Dr. Toni
Laidlaw for her helpful comments on a draft of this paper. In addition, Sheila
Noonan wishes to thank Colin Sumner for his insightful comments and invaluable
support. At an early stage, this paper was presented at a conference entitled Politics
of Pornography: Politics of Prostitution, sponsored by The Ontario Public Interest Re-
search Group, Toronto, November 1985. The paper was completed prior to the
introduction of Bill C-114 (the pornography amendments) during the First Session
of the 33rd Parliament.
1 Sections 1-34 of the Constitution Act, 1982 enacted by the Canada Act, 1982
(U.K.), c. 11, Sched. B. (hereinafter referred to as the Charter).
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embodied gender as a distinction and yet still presents obvious equal-
ity questions. The possibility of a move away from gender-neutrality
as a strategy for achieving equality in this context is worth consider-
ing.
What the authors share is a concern about the limitations of for-
mal equality in these contexts. We question whether identical legal
treatment for men and women is the best form that equality takes
with respect to these issues, feeling that identical treatment is often
important but not always sufficient to create equality.2 Overall, we
stress the need for a flexible, contextualised approach to equality, one
that is informed by an understanding of the actual problems of in-
equality.
3
Furthermore, we share a concern about what are the legitimate
and effective limits to the legal action that is consistent both with
equality and other things of value. With respect to prostitution, the
question is asked whether the criminalization of the behaviour of
women can co-exist with a commitment to the equality of women in
our society. With respect to pornography, the tension between sexual-
ity and social control is explored. What does equality require with
respect to pornography-a little or a lot of law?
Indeed, these areas of concern have more in common than the
fact that they present issues relating to the highly-complex nature of
equality. Sexuality is a major theme with respect to both. In that pros-
titution and pornography share this connection, they come very close
to what it means to be male and female in our society.
The authors are aware of this and feel that the interaction and
tension between sexuality and equality deserves considerable atten-
tion.4 It does not get such attention within the confines of this paper.
However, it is an underlying theme throughout. Women as a group
have little control over the social meaning or expression of sexuality,
although one feminist strategy is to try to achieve at least some influ-
2 In this we share the concerns expressed, on a theoretical level, by Colleen Shep-
pard, in her paper "Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms," and on a practical level, by Susannah Worth
Rowley, in "Women, Pensions and Equality."
3 See genetally R.A. Samek, "A Case for Social Law Reform" (1977), 55 Can. Bar
Rev. 409.
4 It is, in the view of some feminists, central to feminist theory. See C. MacKin-
non, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory"
(1982), 7 Signs 515 and "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983), 8 Signs 635.
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ence over its meaning. Nevertheless, the lack of control at the present
time makes assertions about the autonomy and power of women in
the sex trade extremely problematic. What if my sexuality contributes
to your oppression? What if my struggle to end oppression interferes
with your sexuality? We acknowledge, but do not answer, such ques-
tions.
We confine ourselves in this paper to equality in the criminal law
with respect to adults.
2. PROSTITUTION
A study of the history of the criminal law of prostitution presents
a very clear picture of distinctions based on differing perceptions of
the roles of women and men.5 The picture is, to a certain extent, one
of separate spheres of deviance and non-deviance,6 or in other words,
one of deviant women and normal men. To the extent that it has been
thought appropriate to legislate and then actually use criminal sanc-
tions with respect to prostitution, the law reveals contrasting notions
of what it is that women and men do for which it is appropriate to
punish them.
What follows is not a comprehensive analysis of the law in this
area. Rather an attempt is made to highlight aspects of the law that
are significant from an equality perspective. It is an area that vividly
illustrates the impetus toward gender-neutrality and the deficiencies
and dangers of this approach as a notion of equality.
Equality analysis can be brought to bear on a number of different
areas:
1. criminal legislation;
2. judicial interpretation and application of such legislation; and
3. enforcement practices.
All three areas of decision-making can legitimately be described as
5 For a fuller account of the historical background to the present law, see C. Back-
house "Nineteenth Century Canadian Prostitution Law: Reflection of a Dis-
criminatory Society", forthcoming in Social History/Histoire sociale.
6 For an excellent discussion of such separate spheres across the spectrum of the
criminal law, see E. Schur, Labeling Women Deviant: Gender, Stigma and Social Con-
trol (New York: Random House, 1984).
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forms of government activity or state action. 7 Thus all relevant deci-
sion-makers, legislators, judges, prosecutors and police officers, have
a constitutional duty to respect the standard of equality embodied in
the constitution.,
The general picture is one of a tendency, on the surface of the
law, both legislative and judicial, to move from notions of separate
spheres of deviance to gender-neutrality. Not surprisingly, we know
least about the history of, and the present situation with respect to,
enforcement practices.
(a) Legislation
One does not need to go very far back in the history of criminal
legislation to find some very distinct ideas of separate roles for men
and women. As far as women are concerned, the law was both puni-
tive and protective. Until the 1980s, only women could be victimised
in the series of ways set out in the procuring offences, found in section
195 of the Criminal Code.9 Living on the avails of the prostitution of
another person in section 195(1)() was an ostensibly neutral section,
but judicial interpretation until recently defined prostitution as a
female activity. All the other provisions referred explicitly to "female"
persons. For instance, section 195(1) originally stated:
Every one who
(b) inveigles or entices a female person who is not a common prostitute
or a person of known immoral character to a common bawdy-
house or house of assignation for the purpose of illicit sexual inter-
course or prostitution,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for ten years.
This sub-section provides a hint as to the purpose of the procuring
offences, which was to protect, as the Fraser Report indicates, "virtu-
7 See generally the paper in this volume by Hester Lessard, "The Idea of the 'Pri-
vate': A Discussion of State Action. Doctrine and Separate Sphere Ideology.".
8 This is not to suggest that the Charter may not have an even broader impact. See
Y. de Montigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights", in Equality Rights and The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts eds. (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1985).
9 R.S.C. 1970, c. 'C-34 (hereinafter referred to as the Code).
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ous womanhood". 10 It is noteworthy that the perception was that
women needed to be protected from being "inveigled and enticed",
as opposed to simply forced, into prostitution. These offences were
made gender-neutral several years ago, in the same Act that intro-
duced sexual assault in a gender-neutral form."I
It should be added that the procuring section, paternalistically ad-
dressed to the protection of women, contained a strong corroboration
section. The accused could not be convicted on the evidence of one
witness alone, in the absence of corroboration. 12 This corroboration
provision appeared in the one section that clearly addressed the vic-
timisation of women.
The punitive aspect can be found in a provision that survived until
relatively recently-the "Vag. C." offence. Section 175(1) of the Code
used to state:
Every one commits vagrancy who
(c) being a common prostitute or night walker is found in a public
place and does not, when required, give a good account of herself.
This was repealed in 1972 and replaced by the even more recently re-
pealed soliciting offence in section 195.1,13 partly because of the dis-
crimination inherent in it. '4 The new offence was gender-neutral on
its face, in that it stated that "[e]very person who solicits any person
in a public place for the purpose of prostitution is guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction." Judicial interpretation, discussed
later, cast doubt on its application to men.
So, until recently, the Code reflected the view that women were
prostitutes or in danger of being "inveigled" into prostitution. There
10 Can. Pornography and Prostitution in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Ser-
vices, 1985), p. 403-Fraser Report.
11 Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 13.
12 Code, s. 195(3). An exception relates to s. 195(1)()-living on the avails. This
provision was added in 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. V (1913), c. 13, s. 9 (Canada). Why was
it possible to convict an accused on the word of a prostitute but not on that of
a "virtuous" woman?
13 Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13, ss. 12, 15.
14 See generally, Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Information
Canada, 1970) and the comment by L. Smith on whether the "Vag. C" offence
discriminated against women: (1971), 6 U.B.C. Law Rev. 442.
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was not an explicit form of deviance exclusive to men-indeed the
most notable thing was the fact that customers were, to a great extent,
not labelled as deviant at all. However, section 195(2)-living on the
avails-contained a strong hint that pimps were perceived as male, in
the legislative imagination. It stated:
Evidence that a male person lives with or is habitually in the company of
prostitutes, or lives in a common bawdy-house or house of assignation is, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that he lives on the avails of
prostitution.
The assumption that men were likely to be exploitative of women,
while women in the same situation would not be, was very clear.
Again, this section has been made gender-neutral, in the sense
that the word "male" has been taken out, not that the pronoun has
changed.Is This change forms part of a dramatic pattern of movement
from sex-specific to gender-neutral provisions in this area. It seems
safe to conclude that there is an established legislative policy with re-
spect to prostitution.' 6 This view is reinforced by the passage of the
draconian new soliciting provisions. These are both gender-neutral in
the narrow sense that they apply to both male and female prostitutes,
but also in the broader sense that they make it explicit that customers
may engage in criminal behaviour.
The new section 195.1(1) states as follows:
Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view
(a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle,
(b) impedes the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic or ingress
to or egress from premises adjacent to that place, or
(c) stops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communi-
cates or attempts to communicate with any person
for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services
of a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. ' 7
15 Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 13,
16 One cannot generalize further. The woman-specific criminalization of abortion
in s. 251(2) has not yet been removed. It will be interesting to see whether the
government policy is one of male-specific gender-neutrality, i.e., only offences
that "discriminate" against men are changed.
17 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C-34, as am. by S.C. 1984-85 (1st Session), c. 50,
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The last fourteen years, therefore, have seen a legislative programme
of complete adoption of gender-neutrality as a guiding principle in
the formulation of prostitution offences.
1972 The woman-specific "Vag. C" offence was removed and
replaced by an apparently neutral soliciting offence.
1980-81
-82 The procuring offences were made gender-neutral.
The presumption with respect to living on the avails was
made gender-neutral.
The following gender-neutral definition of prostitution
was added'--"prostitute" means a person of either sex
who engages in prostitution.19
1984-85 Sweeping provisions clearly applying to customers and
male prostitutes were added.
The new offences join the other reformed offences as well as those
which were always expressed in gender-neutral terms, such as keeping
a common bawdy-house 0 and related offences such as causing a dis-
turbance. 2'
In summary, what evidence there is suggests that there were the
following images in the legislative mind:
1. prostitutes were women and deviant;
2. if women were not prostitutes, they were in need of protection
from exploitative males;
3. males were consumers of prostitution and non-deviant; or
18 Critnizal Law Arnendnent Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 124, s. 11.
19 Code, s. 179(1).
20 Code, s. 193.
21 There are a number of offences that, while not related to prostitution per se, could
be used with respect to some of its public manifestations: gross indecency, s.157;
indecent acts, s. 169; nudity, s. 170; causing a disturbance, s. 171; trespassing at
night, s. 173; common nuisance, s. 176. All of these offences are drafted in a
gender-neutral way and do not reveal any conceptions about different male and
female ways of being disorderly or publicly immoral. No assumptions are being
made about enforcement decisions.
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4. exploiters of women;
5. women as well as men could exercise an administrative role in the
commercialisation of prostitution, e.g., in keeping a bawdy-house;
6. there were no distinctly male and female ways of being disorderly
or publicly immoral.
However, for some years now, there has been a concerted legislative
effort to eradicate any suggestion of separate spheres of deviance from
the Code.
Before moving on to the judicial views on this issue, one last
point should be made about behaviour proscribed by the Code. There
are significant silences as well as utterances. While there are certain
carefully-circumscribed sexual offences relating to vulnerable women
and girls,- there is no general crime of exploiting economic need in
order to engage in sexual activity. An atalogy can be drawn to the
concept of the exercise of authority in section 244(3)(d) with respect
to sexual assault. It is a crime to use one's authority to secure sexual
submission but not to exploit one's economic advantages. This omis-
sion is significant in that the area of sexual assault has been recently
reformed,23 at a time when the very serious problem of the poverty
of women was well-known.
Another silence is noteworthy. From a perusal of the Code, one
would not suppose that there was any particular social problem of
police harassment of prostitutes. This suggests the unsurprising point
that prostitutes do not have a voice in the labelling of deviance. This
article is not about that process, although it would be interesting to
know whose ideas were influential. The point is one that will be ad-
dressed later, namely, that equality may have more to do with what
is labelled as deviant, rather than the manner of expressing the prohib-
ition. It is vital that equality analysis be of a type that permits broad
comparisons, ranging over the whole of the criminal law, as opposed
to technical points about the content of particular crimes.24
22 E.g., intercourse with a young female employee, s. 153(l)(b); parent or guardian
procuring defilement, s. 166; seduction of a female passenger on a vessel, s. 154.
23 See generally Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
24 Thus it should be possible to compare the criminalization, for instance, of con-
tempt of court with the legality of incitement to sexual hatred. Suggesting that
a judge is sexist may be punished as contempt, while the statements leading to
the accusation do not come within the scope of any existing crime.
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(b) Judging
The judicial record has, in the past, not been one of concern about
possible discrimination in gender-specific offences. Canadian judges
were willing to accept legislative decisions to punish women for con-
duct that was non-criminal for males. Challenges to such offences on
the basis that they offended the Bill ofRights25 equality provision were
therefore unsuccessful.
R. v. Beaulne; Ex Parte Latreille6 provides one example. The old
"Vag. C" offence was challenged as discriminating on the basis of sex.
It proscribed the status of being a common prostitute or night walker,
found in a public place and unable to give a good account of herself.
Houlden J., of the Ontario High Court, found that it did not discrimi-
nate against women, albeit that it only applied to women:
It is not all females who being found in a public place must give a good ac-
count of themselves, but only females falling within the class of "prostitutes
and night walkers"."
It is hardly surprising to find that the old gender-specific laws
were not struck down by judges. The judiciary did a great deal to
nurture the idea that prostitutes were women and their customers were
male.' Women were the providers of sex and men the consumers.
This not only reveals a great deal about gender roles in the judicial
mind but also exposes the notion of prostitution as a heterosexual ac-
tivity.' 9 Laws that simply reflected reality, as perceived by the
25 R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III.
26 [1971] 1 O.R. 630, 13 C.R.N.S. 98 (sub nora. R. v. Latreile), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 196,
13 Cr. L.Q. 219, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 657 (Ont. H.C.).
27 [1971] 1 O.R. at 632. While the term "night walker" seems merely an archaic
term for prostitute, it is interesting that it was literally stated that a woman walk-
ing at night was suspicious and could be required by the police to explain herself.
HouldenJ., did not find this treatment, a potential for all women, discriminat-
ory. R. v. Lavoie, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 690, 2 C.C.C. (2d) 185, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 647
(B.C. Co. Ct.) also upheld the "Vag. C" offence.
28 See R. v. Knowles, infra, note 36. See also R. v. Cardell (1914), 7 Alta. L.R. 404,
23 C.C.C. 271, 19 D.L.R. 411 (Alta. C.A.): "The word 'prostitute' in the section
evidently means promiscuous sexual intercourse with men."
29 "[W]hat the law intended to repress, according to my opinion, is the keeping of
establishments destined to encourage immoral relations, between men and
women." Dubi v. R., [1948] R.L. 525, 94 C.C.C. 164 (Que. C.A.), p. 171
(C.C.C.), per Pratte J. If one wanted a concept to cover homosexual behaviour
one had to move to indecency. Thus the definition of "common bawdy-house"
is a place used "for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of inde-
cency." Code, s. 179(1).
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judiciary, were therefore inoffensive and, in a sense, inevitable.
The judicial correlation of prostitutes and women was quite con-
sistent. Even recent examples are easy to find.
The Ontario Court of Appeal defined prostitution in terms of
women in R. v. Lantay.s° The court utilized two English decisions in
which prostitution was described exclusively as an activity engaged
in by women. In R. v. De Munck,3 1 it was stated that "prostitution is
proved if it be shown that a woman offers her body commonly for
lewdness for payment in return."32 Similarly, in R. v. Webb3 3 reference
was made to the situation "where a woman offers herself as a particip-
ant in physical acts of indecency for the sexual gratification of men.
34
The differing gender roles could not be made more explicit.
In R. v. Patterson35 an Ontario County Court judge went so far
as to interpret "every person" in section 195.1 to refer to women only.
Thus he refused to convict a prostitute, who was male, of soliciting.
36
Spence J., in the famous Hutt3 case, stated:
I suppose that in Vancouver there are hundreds of pedestrians every day who
request free rides in automobiles, and it would appear ridiculous and abhor-
rent to say that everyone of them who was female and who did so was guilty
of soliciting within the provisions of [s. 195.1].3
8
There were a number of obvious factors influencing this type of think-
ing. First, for a long time the legislative structure assigned two basic
roles to women: either prostitute or woman in need of protection
from exploitative males. Second, dictionary definitions displayed the
30 [1966] 1 O.R. 503, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 270, 47 C.R. 72 (Ont. C.A.).
31 [1918] 1 K.B. 635 (C.C.A.).
32 Ibid., p. 637.
33 [1963] 3 All E.R. 177, [19641 1 Q.B. 357 [1963] 3 W.L.R. 638 (C.C.A.).
34 Ibid., p. 643 (W.L.R.), p. 180 (All E.R.).
35 (197?), 19 C.R.N.S. 289 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
36 Cf R. v. Obey (1973) 21 C.R.N.S. 121 (B.C.S.C.) and R. v. Gallant (1974), 17
C.C.C. (2d) 555 (B.C. Cty. Ct.). The judicial application of gender-neutral
words to women only has some precedent in R. v. Knowles (1913), 12 D.L.R. 639
(Alta.), in which it was held that a man could not be convicted of being an inmate
of a common bawdy-house. The concern was that if a man could be convicted
then a mere [male] servant could be. It was stated at p. 640, in quashing the
conviction, that "the meaning to be attached to the word inmate is an inmate
for the purposes of prostitution and therefore a female."
37 Hutt v. R., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 476, 1 C.R. (3d) 164, 2 W.W.R. 247, 19 N.R. 330,
38 C.C.C. (2d) 418, 82 D.L.R. (3d) 95.
38 Ibid., p. 169 (C.R.), p. 481 (S.C.C.). Italics added.
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same tendency. For instance, in R. v. Patterson39 reliance was placed
on various dictionary definitions that referred to prostitutes as
women, as well as on the usage of the expression "male prostitute".
English case law also reinforced this inclination.
4
0
The negative aspect for women of course lay in the legal and so-
cial meaning of prostitution. As noted in the Fraser Report, in its out-
line of the history of the prostitution laws, "with the partial exception
of bawdy-house provisions, the emphasis of the law was on penalising
the prostitute."'
4 1
Even when the legislative emphasis changed, to some extent,
with the repeal ofthe womati-specific vagrancy law and the enactment
of the apparently neutral soliciting law, 42 there was some judicial resis-
tence to punishing the customer. In R. v. Dudak,43 it was held that a
customer could not be guilty of soliciting for the purpose of prostitu-
tion.
As far as I know there does not exist a problem of groups of potential custom-
ers soliciting and accosting people in public places while looking for prosti-
tutes. It seems to me that if Parliament had intended to bring about such a
radical departure from previous laws on the subject of soliciting . it could
have done so quite simply, concisely and explicitly."
It would indeed have been a departure from the previous laws on pros-
titution per se. The only way a customer could have been punished
was if he were convicted of being found in a common bawdy-house
under section 193(2)(b). I could find one reported case on this sub-
39 Supra, note 35.
40 See the text accompanying notes 30-34.
41 Supra, note 10 at p. 403.
42 Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13, ss. 12, 15. See the text following
note 14, for the wording.
43 [1978] 1 W.W.R. 217, 3 C.R. (3d) 68 at 69, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 172 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
44 Ibid., p. 175 (C.C.C.). Cf. R. v. Di Paola (1978), 4 C.R. (3d) 121, 43 C.C.C. (2d)
199 (Ont. C.A.). There has been a similar reluctance to punish heterosexual cus-
tomers in England. There, s. l(i)(b) of the Vagrancy Act, 1898 (U.K.), c. C-39
made it an offence for a male to solicit persistently or importune for immoral
purposes. This was interpreted in Crook v. Edmondson, [1966] 1 All E.R. 833,
[1966] 2 Q.B. 81 (D.C.), as not applying to soliciting women prostitutes, but
only to inviting homosexual intimacies, and to "touting" on behalf of a female
prostitute. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this as unhelpful in Di Paola.
For a comment on the double standard involved in not punishing the customer,
see E.G. Ewaschuk, "Trick or Treat?: The Offence of Soliciting" (1980), 12 Ot-
tawa L.R. 235.
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section and it involved a decision that a keeper of a common bawdy-
house could not also be convicted as a found-in.4 5 There are no digests
in The Canadian Abridgment. However, the refusal to label the cus-
tomer as deviant is obviously to be traced more to legislative and en-
forcement practices rather than the judiciary.
What other judicial images of men and women can be identified?
Both could be convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house. The
"keeper" did not assume an exclusively male or female shape in the
judicial imagination."
On the positive side, a woman was less likely to exploit another
woman than a man was. In R. v. Odgers" there was a constitutional
challenge to section 195(2). At that time it contained a presumption
that a man was living on the avails of prostitution if he lived with or
was habitually in the company of prostitutes. There was no equivalent
presumption for women, and thus the section was attacked as dis-
criminatory. The judgment contains an explicit assertion that it is
reasonable to assume a man is exploiting a female.
The offence here is a sex-oriented one. It may well be a reasonable infer-
ence that a male who lives with or is habitually in the company of prostitutes
lives on the avails of prostitution. A similar inference could not reasonably
be drawn in the case of a female person. . . .
The courts supplemented the legislative corroboration require-
ments by expressing a distrust of the evidence of prostitutes, who
were, of course, women. R. v. Williams49 suggested that the evidence
of prostitutes be subjected to the most careful scrutiny.
Nevertheless, even the judiciary cannot resist the trend toward
gender-neutrality. There are beginning to be hints that prostitutes can
belong to either sex. Purvis J., of the Ontario Provincial Court, stated
as long ago as 1977, with respect to soliciting, that
45 Labelle v. R., [19571 Que. Q.B. 81 (C.A.).
46 R. v. Warren (1888), 16 O.R. 590 (Q.B.). The Court stressed, in convicting a
husband and wife, that management and not property was in issue. (A property
orientation would have, of course, confined the deviance label, almost exclu-
sively, to men.) It was speculated at p. 592 that the wife "may probably have as
great, maybe a greater share than the husband in the criminal management of
the house."
47 [19781 1 W.W.R. 312, 7 A.R. 192, 37 C.C.C. (2d) 554 (Alta. C.A.).
48 Ibid., p. 557 (C. C. C.), per McGillivray J., for the Court.
49 [1935] 2 W.W.R. 640, 63 C.C.C. 360, [19351 2 D.L.R. 696 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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there must be an importuning, a propositioning, a pestering, of one indi-
vidual, in an attempt by a female, or a male I suppose, to offer services to that
individual.10
Reported cases are very rare indeed, but both R. v. Obeys' and R. v.
Gallants2 held that a male could be found guilty of soliciting for the
purposes of prostitution.
Challenges to the sex-specific elements in prostitution legislation
have of course been anticipated by Parliament. Thus, we will not
know whether the old law would have been upheld as reflecting some
natural division and therefore constitutionally inoffensive. The matter
does not end there, however, as judges may well have to take a stand
on the question of discriminatory enforcement of neutral laws. Judges
themselves have a constitutional obligation to respect the Charter, so
that some of them may resist being implicated in inequality of enforce-
ment should it become possible in the future to establish it to their
satisfaction.
There is no reason for optimism that the judiciary will act
energetically to protect itself from becoming a passive tool in the
hands of discriminatory enforcement agencies. Further, we do not yet
know whether judges would even be willing to consider as constitu-
tionally suspect unequal administration of laws as opposed to inequal-
ity on their face. 3 Still further, there is no consistent pattern yet with
50 R. v. Tyo (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 479 at 480 (Ont. Prov. Ct.). Italics added.
51 [1973] 3 W.W.R. 382, 21 C.R.N.S. 121, 11 C.C.C. (2d) 28 (B.C.S.C.).
52 (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 555 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
53 In an early Morgentaler case, Mr. Justice Laskin refused to review the abortion
provisions on the ground that they were administered unequally. This was a reach
for equality by judicially unmanageable standards. He stated that he did not re-
gard the Bill ofRights as "charging the courts with supervising the administrative
efficiency of legislation or with evaluating the regional or national organisation
of its administration, in the absence of any touchstone in the legislation itselfi"
[19761 1 S.C.R. 616 at 635. This was quoted and adopted by Parker J., in R. v.
Morgentaler (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 353 at 392. It is of course possible that s. 15 will
be given a broader interpretation in view of the much more extensive wording.
However, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in the most recent Morgentaler case,
quoted Laskin C.J.C.'s words with approval, stating that "it is for Parliament
to deal with any unevenness or disparity in the administration of the relieving
provisions of the section:" (1985), 48 C.R. (3d) I at 49. In his annotation to the
case, Professor Stuart says that this "bald proposition cannot be right." He points
to other areas where the courts are clearly concerned with the constitutional ad-
ministration of the law, for instance, with respect to the right to be tried within
a reasonable time: id. at p. 6. It would weaken s. 15 considerably if the courts
refused to review the constitutionality of administrative decisions. However, it
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respect to the judicial view of inequality even on the face of legislation.
Hence, predictions about more subtle forms of discrimination are very
premature. Assuming that judges become willing to review the ad-
ministration of neutral laws, the way they conceptualize equality will
be very significant. What do existing cases tell us about how Canadian
judges understand equality? The cases on gender-specific offences pro-
vide some clues. Ifjudges do not find crimes that can only be commit-
ted by members of one sex constitutionally offensive, then thev are
very unlikely to be concerned about enforcement against one sex. The
cases seem to fall into three camps so far.
First, there is a strong thread of the "legislation can reflect natural
differences" approach.-" This can be illustrated in its clearest form by
two recent decisions of the Manitoba Court of Appeal.
Re Marzan and R."5 involved an unsuccessful argument based on
the fact that there was a different (and higher) maximum penalty for
indecent assault by a male on another male as compared to indecent
assault on a female.
[Alccording to the age-old traditions ofJudaeo-Christian morality, the types
of indecent assault are quire different .... The distinction drawn by the Code
is not as to persons but as to type of activities.
5 6
R. v. McIntosh"7 dealt with a challenge to section 153; that is, illicit
intercourse between a man and his foster daughter. It was unani-
mously held that this section does not discriminate on the basis of
sex-the fact that only a female can be a complainant was held to be
due to the type of conduct involved.
What he [counsel for the accused] seems to have entirely forgotten is that the
distinction--or the inequality or the discrimination as he may call it-does
not arise from an Act of Parliament but from an act of Mother Nature. In
that respect Parliament cannot be taxed of an unfair or unequal Act since the
sexes by nature are different .... Counsel for the accused in his vain attempt
to force equality has mixed apples and oranges and cannot be successful."8
should be noted that the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that in individual
cases "the established inequality or discriminatory treatment could be such as to
render the section inoperative in those cases:" id. at p. 50.
54 Hence, one assumes, administration could reflect natural differences.
55 (198t), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 479, 14 Man. R. (2d) 143, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 370 (Man.
C.A.). Leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused 64 C.C.C. (2d) 479 (S.C.C.).
56 Ibid., p. 480 (C.C.C.), per O'Sullivan J.A. for the Court.
57 [1984] 4 W.W.R. 734, 28 Man. R. (2d) 81 (Man. C.A.).
58 Ibid., 741-742 (W.W.R.), per Monnin C.J.M.
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It is this type of natural differences reasoning which may be used to
justify the upholding of the woman-specific abortion offence in sec-
tion 251(2) of the Code. In effect, it has been so upheld already in R.
v. Morgentaler.9 The Ontario Court of Appeal, in rejecting the argu-
ment that section 251 discriminated on the basis of sex, adopted the
statement that any "inequality between the sexes in this area is not
created by legislation but by nature."60 There is nothing inherent in
this approach that makes it advantageous to women. The difference
in question in any case could be turned into a disadvantage or an ad-
vantage, or could possibly be both.
A second tendency is to strike out all distinctions as being con-
stitutionally offensive. The cases in this group seem typically to in-
volve arguments that legislation discriminates against men. For exam-
ple, in R. v. Lucas,61 statutory rape was declared unconstitutional. In
Shewchuk v. Ricard,"2 the Child Paternity and Support Act was struck
down at first instance, as being discriminatory against men.'
A third class of cases includes those in which certain distinctions
are found to be justified, by something other than nature. The action
of the British Columbia Supreme Court in overturning the first in-
stance decision in Shewchuk v. Ricard65 is an illustration. So is the first
instance decision in Blainey v. Ont. Hockey Assn. 6  The exclusion by
the Association of females from membership in hockey clubs was
59 (1985), 48 C.R. (3d) 1, 52 O.R. (2d) 353, 11 O.A.C. 81, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 22
D.L.R. (4th) 641, 17 C.R.R. 223 (Ont. C.A.).
60 Ibid., 50 (C.R.) quoting RitchieJ., in Bliss v. A.G. Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 at
190. It is interesting that the Court chose to quote from one of the most notorious
cases in Canadian equality jurisprudence.
61 (1985), 16 C.R.R. 1, 6 C.H.R.R. D/3002 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), reversed (1986), 14
O.A.C. 124 (sub nor. R. v. Lucas; R. v. Neely) (Ont. C.A.). See also R. v. Neely
(1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 73 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) and R. v. D.I.L. (1985), 46 C.R. (3d)
172 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). In the latter case, Kent D.C.J. stated, orally, at p. 178, that
"the proper course for the Parliament of Canada would be to continue the trend
started with the sexual assault amendments to the Code ......
62 [19851 6 W.W.R. 427, 17 C.R.R. 117 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
63 The appeal to the B.C.S.C. was successful: [19851 6 W.W.R. 436, 66 B.C.L.R.
107.
64 This may not be a separate category at all. The "no distinctions" cases could be
seen as decisions that no satisfactory justification had been offered.
65 Supra, note 63.
66 (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 255, 6 C.H.R.R. D/3016, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 599 (Ont. H.C.),
reversed (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 5133, 14 FO.A.C. 194, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 728 (Ont.
C .A.), with the denial that distinctions could be justified.
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found to promote a significant state interest. Thus the exclusion was
justified under section 1 of the Charter.
The most that can be said at the moment, bearing in mind the
slight trend in the context of prostitution and the differing judicial
approaches to equality, is that there may be a growing understanding
that gender is a suspect proxy for some other functional classification.
These small roots would need to flower into a sophisticated analysis
of equality and be combined with a willingness to scrutinize adminis-
trative enforcement decisions before one could be certain that judges
will assume the responsibility of ensuring that gender-neutral legisla-
tion is not applied in a discriminatory way. It is important, however,
that judges undertake such a responsibility in order to protect the con-
stitutional integrity of their process.
(c) Enforcement
Is it reasonable to assume that we may have a problem of dis-
crimination on the part of the people responsible for the enforcement
of the law? While not a criminal matter, a recent Nova Scotian case
is revealing.67 The Attorney-General sought an injunction against a
number of Halifax women alleged to be prostitutes. The argument
was that the public manifestations of prostitution constituted a com-
mon nuisance, which the Court had the power to enjoin. While it was
clear that people of both sexes contributed to the alleged nuisance, the
proceedings were taken against women only, notice being given by
posting the names of women on lamp-posts in the city. Section 15
was not then in force, and it seemed to have no effect in making law
enforcement officials consider the offensiveness of isolating a number
of people on the basis of their sex and proceeding against them with
respect to a social problem to which both sexes contributed. 6 The
action was unsuccessful but not because this process was inconsistent
with any concept of sexual equality or because the Court objected to
an unconstitutional abuse of its process.
Enforcement receives some attention in the Fraser Report. The
figures reveal that charges with respect to bawdy-house offences have
67 A.G. N.S. v. Beaver (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 281, 49 C.P.C. 295, 32 C.C.L.T. 170,
18 D.L.R. (4th) 286 (N.S.C.A.).
68 Of course, s. 28 was then in force. Clearly law enforcement officials, in the exer-
cise of their own independent responsibility to respect the constitution, did not
feel that this section prevented them from proceeding against women only.
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been declining steadily although not uniformly across the country. 69
The procuring offences, with their historical theme of the protection
of women, are not utilized to any great extent. 70 The prosecutions for
soliciting and pimping have dropped dramatically in recerit years71
and the discontent of police forces has tended to focus on the need for
a strengthening of their powers in this context.
72
The Fraser Report, however, does not contain any analysis of en-
forcement patterns with respect to the sex of the persons victimised,
charged or convicted. While such a breakdown is available with re-
spect to persons charged, it is not very illuminating. With respect to
bawdy-house offences, the picture varies. For instance, in 1981, 681
males were charged compared to 471 females. 73 In 1984, charges were
brought against 336 males and 507 females. 74 Procuring (aside from
pimping) seems predominately a male offence according to the
charges brought.7-
Unfortunately, pimping (stereotypically male) and soliciting
(stereotypicaly female) are lumped together under the heading,
"Other Prostitution Offences," so one can discover nothing from the
statistics76 about the pimp/prostitute/customer gender breakdown. It
69 The Fraser Report, at p. 410. There were 1,143 prosecutions in 1975, compared to
269 charges reported in 1982. I found 391 in Canadian Crime Statistics (Statistics
Canada, 1982).
70 The Fraser Report, at p. 416. The numbers fluctuated between 100 and 200 from
1974-1982.
71 Ibid., pp. 421-426.
72 See generally, ibid., Ch. 27.
73 Canadian Crime Statistics (Statistics Canada, 1981).
74 Canadian Crime Statistics (Statistics Canada, 1984).
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is clear only that very few charges are brought. Charges in relation
to indecent acts and public morals are mostly brought against males.
7 7
The statistics for reported and unfounded offences are not broken
down by gender. At the very least, such figures would be necessary
to enable us to develop a clearer picture with respect to police
strategies and whether they are indeed influenced by gender.
Common sense would indicate that in this context, enforcement
patterns are more likely to reflect the gender of the police officers as-
signed to collect the necessary evidence. What little research there has
been shows a reluctance to utilize prostitution laws against custom-
ers. 
78
Even if we knew more about enforcement practices, it would still
be necessary to analyse the data using a coherent notion of equality.
Many equality theorists have stressed the need to focus on results
rather than the formulation of rules in themselves. This is helpful in
that we would not have achieved much if we had gender-neutral pros-
titution law enforced against women only. However, the equality goal
can hardly be one of equal numbers of male and female persons pro-
secuted. Enforcement figures ought to reflect the gender of persons
actually engaging in the deviant behaviour.
Gender imbalance would not be troublesome if one could be con-
fident of two things. First, it is important that the definition of what
is deviant not reflect a male perspective. Second, given an equal label-
ling process, we need some way of distinguishing between dis-
criminatory enforcement distorting the definition and producing dif-
ferent numbers of male and female accused persons, and a non-dis-
criminatory pattern that simply happened to produce such differences.
77 See, e.g., Canadian Crime Statistics (Statistics Canada 1984).
Males Females
Indecent Acts 2,587 254
Public Morals 386 89
(ss. 159, 162-168)
78 See P.A. Roby, "Politics and Prostitution: A Case Study of the Revision, Enforce-
ment, and Administration of the New York State Penal Laws on Prostitution"
(1971-72), 9 Criminology 425. This study showed that there was enough political
pressure to include "patronizing", but the law was rarely used. Since the new
soliciting law came into force, a number of alleged customers have been prose-
cuted in Nova Scotia. It will be some time before it will be possible to study
patterns of police and prosecutorial behaviour.
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Such a test of equality in enforcement of the law is now crucial.
The trend toward gender-neutrality in legislating and judging is likely
to drive whatever discrimination there is underground into enforc-
ment decisions. Thus, a test of what is equal enforcement will be
necessary in order to challenge the constitutionality of the criminal
law in practice.
Does American jurisprudence provide a test of unequal enforce-
ment? The basic approach seems to be one of deference to Drosecuto-
rial discretion. Thus, the exercise of some selectivity in the application
of a criminal statute is not per se, a denial of equal protection. 9 In this
particular context, it has been held that there may be valid reasons for
prosecuting a prostitute and not a customer. However, equal protec-
tion may be violated by intentional discriminatory enforcement and
application."' This is very difficult to establish. Some lower courts
have been satisfied that neutral prostitution laws have been applied in
a discriminatory fashion, but such findings rarely survive appeal.8 2
79 See cases cited in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16B, p. 603.
80 State v. Johnson (1976), 246 N.W (2d) 5003 (Wis.); People v. Garner (1977), 72
C.A. 3d 214 (Cal App.) held that if there is a difference in the kind of conduct,
there is no denial of equality, even though the conduct is of equal culpability.
For a general discussion of U.S. equality challenges, see C. Rosenbleet and B.J.
Pariente, "The Prostitution of the Criminal Law" (1973), 11 Am. Crim. Law
Rev. 373. Such attacks are "extricably entwined with the reality that no matter
how neutrally the statutes are worded, prostitution is traditionally a sex-defined
crime, applicable to only one sex or used in practice against one sex:" id., at p.
381.
81 See cases cited in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16B, at p. 606-607. The early
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 held that discriminatory enforce-
ment of the law could be attacked.
82 See e.g., Morgan v. City of Detroit (1975), 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich); United
States v. Moses (1975), 339 A. 2d 46 (D.C.); United States v. Wilson (1975), 342 A.
2d 27 (D.C.); People v. Sup. Ct. (1977), 138 Cal. Rptr. 66. It is hardly surprising
that enforcement patterns are very difficult to challenge in the U.S. Courts have
upheld prostitution statutes that, on their face, apply only to women, deferring
to the legislative judgment on this matter. Thus, in Sunpter v. State (1974). 306
N.E. 2d 95 (Ind.), appeal dismissed 419 U.S. 811, appeal after remand 340 N.E.
2d, 764, cert. denied 425 U.S. 952, it was held that the punishment of women
only did not violate the right to equal protection. See also State v. Devall (1974),
302 So. 2d 909 (La.). "Neutral" statutes applying to prostitutes but not custom-
ers have also been upheld: Blake v. State (1975), 344 A. 2d 260 (Del. Super Cr..
See also U.S. v. Moses and U.S. v. Wilson, supra. There are some cases displaying
sensitivity to the discrimination inherent in isolating women. For an early exam-
ple, see People v. Edwards (1920), 180 N.Y.S. 631, at 634-35 (N.Y. Cty. Ct.). "The
men create the market, and the women who supply the demand pay the penalty.
It is time that this unfair discrimination and injustice should cease." See also Plas
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If intention is rejected as a test in Canada, a replacement test of
discriminatory enforcement will be necessary. Obviously, police have
a great deal of discretion, which can be properly exercised on grounds
other than gender. It might be enough simply to inquire if gender
were a factor, whether consciously or unconsciously.
Two points can be made, however, about the search for a test
other than intention. First, the obvious practical and theoretical
difficulties in developing a workable test demonstrate how justifiable
it is to feel concern about the move toward gender-neutrality. A fa-
cially-neutral law may simply move the reality of unequal treatment
to an area where it becomes relatively invisible, and thus less chal-
lengeable than before. Second, the question must be asked whether
the drive toward gender-neutrality in enforcement, as a logical exten-
sion of gender-neutrality in definitions, is, in fact, misconceived as a
goal. It might even be dysfunctional in this context.
Thus the following section addresses the question of whether
there is a better approach to equality in the criminal law on prostitu-
tion.
(d) Beyond Formal Equality
In order to highlight the problem of the meaning of equality with
respect to prostitution law, it may be helpful to ask the following ques-
tion. Would we have achieved equality if we had gender-neutral pros-
titution law even-handedly enforced against both sexes? We might
have eradicated the double standard, which was clearly unequal, but
is the absence of it equality?
Gender-neutrality, as an abstraction, takes on a different signifi-
cance depending on its context. It may sometimes be positive for
women, sometimes negative and sometimes unimportant either way.
It seems relatively insignificant to couch largely unenforced protective
laws in gender-neutral terms. It seems at least a positive step to eradi-
cate the double standard with respect to soliciting. However, the very
concept that leads to that reform would prevent customers alone being
labelled as deviant.83 This clearly emerges in the discussion above on
v. State (1979), 598 P. 2d 966 (Alaska), in which a clause of a prostitution statute
prohibiting certain conduct "by a female" was found invalid, City of Yakima v.
Esqueda (i9B0), 612 P. 2d 921 (Wash. App.) and In re P (1977), 92 Misc. 2d 62
(N.Y. Fain. Ct.).
83 See the Fraser Report, supra, note 10, p. 362. The proposal was made by Professor
Constance Backhouse and a group of law students from the University of West-
ern Ontario. The response in the Report is that the "major criticism ... is the
possibility that it would be open to challenge under the equality provisions" of
the Charter.
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the eradication of gender as a factor in police and prosecutorial discre-
tion.
These conclusions come not from an examination of the internal
coherence and assumptions of prostitution law, but from ail analysis
that places prostitution in its wider social and economic context. The
issue is whether gender-neutrality in prostitution law and enforcement
is a flawed and limited goal within a context of the subordination of
women.s
4
To limit our equality goal to gender-neutrality would be to aim
for a symmetrical law. It is submitted that the issue of prostitution (as
well as pornography) is an asymmetrical one. It is asymmetrical in
various ways, since there are distortions of gender, sexuality, class and
race.
It is further submitted that feminist analysis,85 while acknowledg-
ing a major dilemma 6 in this area, can provide some helpful insights
into alternative aspirations.
84 For a discussion of this concept, see the essay by Colleen Sheppard in this vol-
ume, supra, note 2.
85 See generally, N. Erbe, "Prostitutes: Victims of Men's Exploitation and Abuse"
(1984), 11 Law and Inequality 609; K. Barry, "Female Sexual Slavery" (New York:
Avon Books, 1981); B. Heye, "Prostitution: An Extreme Case of Sex Stratifica-
tion", in The Criminology of Deviant Women, F. Adler and R. James Simon, eds.
(Boston: Houghton Mufflin, 1979).
86 A dilemma described by Edwin Schur in his book Labeling Women Deviant, supra,
note 6 at pp. 171-172:
"On the one hand, the objectification and commoditization of women central to
[prostitution] are anathema to most feminists. Kate Millett has
suggested . . . that 'prostitution is somehow paradigmatic, somehow the very
core of the female's social condition .... It is not sex the prostitute is really
made to sell: it is degradation.' Yet women who become prostitutes, it is felt,
are the victims and not the perpetrators of the practice. So while most feminists
wish to strongly oppose prostitution, they would like to do so without implying
disapproval of prostitutes. Several additional factors compound the dilemma.
Some activist-prostitutes demand unqualified endorsement of their right to select
this line of "work" and they repudiate any feminist stance-including an exces-
sive stress on their victimization-which they believe smacks of pity or condes-
cension. At the same time, among nonprostitutes within the women's liberation
movement, the degree of commitment to and solidarity with prostitutes as 'sis-
ters' working together in a joint effort has been unclear.... Finally, feminist
opponents of prostitution wish to avoid seeming in any way to favor, or to give
support to those who favor, a general movement toward sexual repression. ...
Confronting this still unresolved dilemma, contemporary feminists have usually
made a two-fold recommendation with respect to prostitution. This means re-
moving from the statute books the legal ban on prostitution (though penalties
could still be kept for pimping and for abusive treatment of prostitutes). Such
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First, feminist analysis brings to the foreground the differing
economic contexts in which men and women live. s7 Also, it highlights
the inadequate legal responses to women's poverty. 8 When the issue
is broadened in this way, the inequality in punishing at least some
women for trying to earn their living against a background of dispro-
portionate poverty is evident. This point is heightened by the fact that
the criminal law can realistically only be enforced against people with-
out the resources to carry out their activities in secure privacy.8 9
Second, it is worth considering that the very legal construct of
"prostitute" is discriminatory in itself. Women have little control over
the legal or social meaning of prostitution. It is significant that
feminist analysis helps us to refuse to isolate the prostitute.90 If one
sees prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation, it is certainly not a
unique form.
Third, the law in its present formulation and probably in the
limits of its effective enforcement, maintains the public/private divi-
removal is to be distinguished from any form of 'legalization'-in which gov-
ernmental licensing or regulation of prostitutes would imply state approval or
at least acceptance of prostitution as a general practice....
While decriminalization is seen as desirable in the short run, most of its feminist
advocates stress that it should not however be viewed as a long-range 'solution'.
They emphasize that the ultimate goal must be to do away with prostitution by
eliminating the male demand for it." [References omitted.)
87 For a discussion of women's poverty, with references, see the essay by Susannah
Worth Rowley in this volume, supra, note 2.
88 Ibid.
89 For a privacy analysis, see C.D. Perry, "Right of Privacy Challenges to Prostitu-
tion Statutes" (1980), 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 439. For that and other constitutional
problems such as vagueness and overbreadth, see E.F. Murray, "Anti-prostitu-
tion Laws: New Conflicts in the Fight Against the World's Oldest Profession"
(1979), 43 Albany L.R. 360.
90 See, e.g., S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Bantam, 1961), pp. 523-541. It would
seem that this was part of the reasoning behind the proposal of the Advisory
Council on the Status of Women to criminalize all pressing and persistent solici-
tation. See the Fraser Report, supra, note 10, p. 516, and generally their report,
Prostitution in Canada (1984). One can try to stop the isolation in various ways-
by defining deviant acts in a manner that includes non-sexual behaviour, for in-
stance assaultive, annoying or exploitative behaviour, and by seeing the
similarities between prostitution and other sexual activities.
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sion rejected by feminists. 9t The law focuses on the public manifesta-
tions of prostitution, while leaving private sexual transactions un-
touched. This very contrast should lead us to question the real interests
that are being protected by the law. It may form part of the overall
structure of state regulation in which sexual inequality is so pervasive
as to be practically invisible.
If one sees inequality in the law as the legal expression of the
subordination of women, formal equality or gender-neutrality
obscures rather than eradicates that subordination. The feminist con-
cern is with the subordination of women in general-subordination
that takes somewhat different forms in different contexts but that,
overall, has more in common than not. This is why I think that con-
cern about prostitutes is not a paternalistic concern but a natural con-
cern of women about the specific circumstances in which other
women find themselves. At bottom, the question about equality to
me is whether the prostitution of women is part of the overall subor-
dination of women. If it is, the punishment of women, either under
gender-neutral or gender-specific laws, compounds that oppression.
92
This brings me to a basic concern that is aroused as much by the
recommendations of the Fraser Report as by the new soliciting of-
fences. Both envisage the punishment of women prostitutes for forms
of soliciting behaviour.
Recommendation 58 of the Fraser Report contains the following
proposed amendment to section 171 (1), disorderly conduct, etc.:
91 See generally for the argument that the root of the inequality of the sexes lies in
the dichotomy between the public and the private, K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divi-
sions in Law (London: Weiderifeld and Nicholson, 1985). See also C. MacKinnon,
"The Male Ideology of Privacy: A Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abor-
tion" (1983), 17 (No. 4) Radical America 23.
92 I do not mean to suggest that prostitutes should be immune from any criminal
prosecution, but that punishment for activities associated with prostitution per
se should be constitutionally suspect. This leaves the problematic question of
whether offences not specifically to do with prostitution, such as causing a distur-
bance, could legitimately be used against prostitutes. On an abstract level, there
seems to be nothing offensive about that. Women prostitutes should not be any
more free to create public disturbances than any one else. However, within the
context of our history of defining and enforcing the criminal law, the legitimate
fear is that the use of such laws may be only a colourable device for doing indi-
rectly what cannot be done directly. The problem remains that certain be-
haviours, such as accosting people in the street, are not the same when engaged
in by a poor black woman as a wealthy white male. What this paper suggests is
that less rather than more willingness to treat the former as deviant is consistent
with equality.
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Everyone who
( d) stands, stops, wanders about in or drives through a public place for
purposes of offering to engage in prostitution or of employing the services
of a prostitute or prostitutes and on more than one occasion,
(i) beckons to, stops or attempts to stop pedestrians or attempts to
engage them in conversation,
(ii) stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles,
(iii) impedes the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, or of in-
gress or egress from premises adjacent to a public place
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction subject to a
maximum fine of $1,000.00."
This does not differ significantly from the new offences in section
195.1, discussed earlier.
The inevitable conclusion is that the inequality of women may
be so embedded in our social and economic structures and in the for-
mulation and enforcement of our laws, that at the present time there
is no constitutionally appropriate way, consistent with equality, to
punish women prostitutes.9 4 The constitutional right to punish, since
it involves a duty to punish equally, may have to await de facto equals
to punish.
I realize that these are far from practical concerns, given the fact
that we are still struggling with the double standard in judicial and
enforcement decisions. In essence, the point is that the eradication of
the double standard (should that happen) does not address the question
of what standard to apply to the law in asking if it displays equal
respect for women and men in the circumstances in which they have
to live, earn their living and express their sexuality.
3. PORNOGRAPHY
The arrogant perceiver falsifies . .. but he also coerces the objects of his
perception into satisfying the conditions his perception imposes. He tries to
accomplish in a glance what the slave masters and batterers accomplish by
extended use of physical force, and to a greater extent he succeeds. He man-
ipulates the environment, perception, and judgment of her whom he per-
93 Supra, note 10 at pp. 538-539.
94 This does not sound like a very firm or confident conclusion, but it best expresses
why I have so much difficulty in deciding what is an ethically-defensible position
on the law of prostitution. I recognise that it leads to the argument that customers
should not be punished either as this is indirect harassment of prostitutes, but
feel even more ambivalence about taking that next step.
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ceives so that her recognized options are limited, and the course she chooses
will b~e such as coheres with his purposes. The seer himself is an element of
her environment. The structures of his perception are as solid a fact in her
stituation as are the structures of a chair which seats her too low or of gestures
which threaten."
This section of the paper should be placed within the broader
context of the massive body of literature on the subject of pornog-
raphy.96 It is not an effort to add to or explore, except in a cursory
fashion, the continuing feminist debate on this subject. Rather, it con-
tinues the challenge to gender-neutrality as a legislative and judicial
goal for the achievement of equality by exposing the limitations of
such an approach.
As a result, a number of initial assumptions are made. It is taken
as a given that the inequality of women is ubiquitous in contemporary
society and that the content of pornographic depictions operates to
legitimate that subordination. Further, pornography is assumed to as-
sist in the production of sexual inequality.9 7 From this position, por-
nography poses a threat to the achievement of meaningful sexual
95 M. Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (New York: Crossing
Press, 1983), p. 67.
96 There are many excellent works on the subject of pornography. Without attempt-
ing an exhaustive list, see, for example, Take Back the Night: Women on Pornog-
raphy, L. Lederer, ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980);
A Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Perigee, 1981);
Women Against Censorship, V. Burstyn, ed. (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre,
1985); C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue" (1985), 2 Yale Law & Policy Rev.
321; C. MacKinnon, "Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech" (1985), 20 Harv.
Cir. Rts.-Civ. Lib. Law Rev. 1; E. Hoffman, "Feminism, Pornography, and
Law" (1985), 133 U. Penn. Law Rev. 497; K. Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and
The Law: A Feminist Critique" (1985), 17 Ottawa Law Rev. 33; L. Clark,
"Liberalism and Pornography", in Pornography and Censorship, D. Copp and S.
Wendell, eds. (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1983).
97 I am not, here, attempting to argue a direct causal link between pornography
and inequality, but rather that there is a dialectical relationship between images
contained in pornographic depictions, and heterosexual expressions of sexuality
as we know them. These representations of sexuality construct our understand-
ing of what it is to be male and female, which plays out such that sexual charac-
teristics become proxies for power and powerlessness. However, the empirical
research on the effects of pornography is discussed by M. Gershel in "Evaluating
a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography: Legal Analysis as if Women
Mattered" (1985), 11 William Mitchell Law Review 41, at notes 75-76, and by C.
MacKinnon in "Not a Moral Issue," supra, note 96. See especially, Pornography
and Sexual Aggression, N. Malamuth and E. Donnerstein, eds. (New York:
Academic Press, 1984).
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equality. It is within this context that it is necessary to examine the
role the law plays in reinforcing the ideology of pornography, thereby
affecting the concrete conditions of women's reality.9"
A study of the history of the criminal law on obscenity, unlike
that on prostitution, does not readily disclose different perceptions of
the role of women and men. The Code provisions are completely gen-
der-neutral. Both the legislation and its judicial interpretation have
been framed without reference to gender. However, I want to argue
that gender-neutrality as a legislative goal and constitutionally en-
forced norm serves only to obscure the fact that the current criminal
law with respect to obscenity conceals gender inequality. In this re-
spect, the law as presently framed cannot offset pornography's dis-
criminatory effects.9 9 Traditionally, feminists have long rejected the
contention that legislation, at least outside the area of "real" biological
differences between the sexes, i.e., pregnancy and reproduction,
should in any way purport to deal with women differently from
men. ,0 Unfortunately, formal legal equality has rarely challenged un-
derlying social inequities. What is required is a legal form that directly
addresses these fundamental realities.
98 My argument here is that the gendered representations of dominance and submis-
sion, power and powerlessness, contained in pornographic depictions, are but
reflections on the level of sex of the more universal subordination of women.
See also, C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue," supra note 96, who argues that
pornography reflects the reality of women's experience within heterosexual sex-
ual relations.
99 This view underlies Ordinance #3, City of Minneapolis (1984), drafted by C.
MacKinnon and A. Dworkin. Section 139.10 of the Ordinance contains the fol-
lowing special findings in pornography:
"[Plornography is central in creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the
sexes. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination
based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it
promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for
equality of rights in employment, education, property rights, public accommo-
dations and public services; create public harassment and private denigration;
promote injury and degradation such as rape, battery and prostitution and inhibit
just enforcement of laws against these acts; contribute significantly to restricting
women from full exercise of citizenship and participation in public life, including
in neighborhoods; damage relations between the sexes; and undermine women's
equal exercise of rights to speech and action guaranteed to all citizens under the
constitutions and laws of the United States and the State of Minnesota."
100 See, for example, W. Williams, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts and Feminism" (1982), 7 Women's Rights Law Report 175.
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Therefore, movement towards a contextualized "inequalities"101
analysis would seem crucial if -substantive sexual equality is to be
achieved. Of necessity, such an approach would seek to address the
social situation in which women find themselves vis-a-vis a particular
problem. Whether legislation would infringe norms of sexual equality
would thus no longer be assessed by insistence on similar treatment
in all situations. On this basis, what follows is an examination of the
existing criminal legislation and the judicial interpretation of it,'0 2 with
particular attention to the recent moves towards a gender-sensitive
treatment to the problems posed by pornography.
(a) Obscenity Legislation
Reading the legislation discloses no story of women's sexuality.
Legislative history, however, does have a tale to tell about sex. Prior
to the enactment of the current Code provisions, the test for obscenity
was that formulated in R. v. Hicklin:1
0 3
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and cor-
rupt those whose minds are open to immoral influences, and into whose hands
a publication of this sort may fall.'
In 1953, the Parliament adopted a series of criminal provisions pur-
porting to deal with sexual offences, offences against public morals,
101 See C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Yale University Press,
1979), p. 126. The thrust of such an approach is to begin with the recognition
of male dominance and to "inquire whether a particular classification tends to
facilitate and reinforce the subordination of women to men. Under this ap-
proach, sex discrimination is wrong not because it is irrational or arbitrary, but
because it creates and maintains a sexual hierarchy that systematically disadvan-
tages women:" F. Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis" (1984), 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387 at 397.
102 Given the absolute gender-neutrality of the obscenity laws, it is difficult to dis-
cern an equality issue with respect to the enforcement of the law. This is not to
suggest that enforcement practices are unproblematic from an equality perspec-
tive, for failure to enforce the law is not "neutral" in its effect on women. The
Fraser Report documents the extent of the pornography industry in Canada.
Women's equality is affected by the law's failure to prevent the dissemination
of pornographic materials.
103 R. v. Hicklin (1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
104 Ibid., p. 371.
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and disorderly conduct.' 5 By virtue of section 159(1) of the Code, it
is an offence to make, print, publish, distribute, or circulate "any
obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record, or other
thing whatsoever." Section 159(8) deems obscene, "any publication a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or
of sex and any one or more of the following subjects,namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence .... "It was subsequently judicially es-
tablished that section 159(8) is the sole test for obscenity and entirely
replaces the former Hicklin test.10 6 For material to be within the ambit
of the legislation, the exploitation of sex must be a dominant charac-
teristic of the work. Furthermore, such exploitation must be
"undue". 107
The legislation thus creates no distinctions on the basis of sex; on
its face the law is entirely gender-neutral and, from a formalist per-
spective, does not raise a gender-equality issue. Judicial history clearly
reveals that the law was designed to protect public morality by seeking
to uphold standards of decency. 108 It seeks to suppress public expres-
105 See Part IV of the Code, ss. 138-178. Section 159(8) was added in 1959. Note
that although a number of these provisions have now been repealed (in particu-
lar, those dealing with sexual offences), the obscenity provisions were un-
touched. The obscenity provisions still appear under the sub-heading "Offences
Tending to Corrupt Morals."
106 See Brodie v. R., [1962) S.C.R. 681, 3 C.R. 120, 132 C.C.C. 161, 32 D.L.R. (2d)
507 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Dechow, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 951, 40 C.R.N.S. 129, 35
C.C.C. (2d) 22, 16 N.R. 204, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
107 Quaere whether such exploitation might ever be "due". Ilterestingly, by impli-
cation the Code legitimates sexual exploitation-a stance scarcely surprising in
a patriarchal society. See Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (New York: Avon, 1971).
108 It is important to note that the "moral" discourse retained by the obscenity
legislation obscures the fact that "good" and "evil" are but masks for a "mor-
ality" that ensures the stability of the family unit, thereby reinforcing male con-
trol over female sexuality, and hence patriarchal power. There seems little doubt
that the discourse of morality here is used to promote patriarchal ideology. C.
MacKinnon, in "Not a Moral Issue," supra, note 96, at p. 329, explains it in
the following manner:
"Animated by morality from the male standpoint, in which violation-of
women and rules-is eroticized, obscenity law can be seen to proceed according
to the interests of male power, robed in gender-neutral good and
evil. . . . JPYublic is opposed to pilvate, in parallel with ethics and morality,
and factual is opposed to value determinations. These distinctions are gender-
based: female is private, moral, valued, subjective; male is public, ethical, fac-
tual, objective. If such gendered concepts are constructs of the male experience,
imposed from the male standpoint on society as a whole, liberal morality expres-
ses male supremacist politics. That is, discourse conducted in terms of good and
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sions of sexuality, in the name of preserving the moral fabric of the
community.' °9 Sex is equated with sin. The discourse of morality,
aided by objective, gender-neutral language, obscures the fact that sex
is gendered."10
Not only, are the moral assumptions underlying the Code provi-
sions problematic, but more significantly so is the notion of the
"undue exploitation of sex." First, the requirement of the exploitation
of sex means that certain kinds of representations that have no obvious
sexual content will not be captured: e.g., the depiction of a woman's
leg with spiked heel being put through a meat grinder. Moreover, it
has been suggested that the concept of the "exploitation of sex" is
inherently specious. It presents a fetishized view; namely that it is sex
itself that can be exploited,"' rather than its participants. This fetishi-
zation of sex necessarily leads to a further denial of contextualization.
It fails to capture the reality that it is female sexuality that is com-
modified and vilified within pornography.
Neither the existing legislation nor any subsequent federal crim-
inal law reform proposals seek to approach pornographic materials in
a manner which recognizes the gender-specific nature of the harm por-
nography produces." 2 Adopting an "inequalities analysis" the ques-
evil which does not expose the gendered foundations of these concepts proceeds
oblivious to-and serves to disguise the presence and interest of-the position
of power that underlies, and is furthered by, that discourse."
In any event, it would appear that women may be guided by a very different
set of moral principles than men. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1982).
109 See K. Mahoney and E. Hoffman, supra, note 96.
110 C. MacKinnon, in "Not a Moral Issue," supra, note 96 at p. 326, explains por-
nography in this way:
"With the rape and prostitution in which it participates, pornography in-
stitutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the eroticization of
dominance and submission with the social construction of male and female. Gen-
der is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning of that sexuality. Men treat
women as who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is.
Men's power over women means that the way men see women defines who
women can be."
111 This idea was suggested to me by the co-author of this essay.
112 While the Fraser Committee recommended dropping the term obscenity in favor
of provisions governing pornography, its recommendations are arguably less
sensitive to gender inequality than those adopted by the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in Red Hot Video v. R., infra, note 134. See S. Noonan, "Pornography:
Preferring The Feminist Approach of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
that of the Fraser Committee" (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 61. Bill C-114, An Act to
amend the Criminal Code and the Customs Tariff received first reading on June 10,
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tion to be addressed is: Does the law's stance contribute to the con-
tinued subordination of women? If one accepts the premise that the
law speaks as much through its silences as through its utterances," 3
the law's failure to regulate the existence of pornography is not a neu-
tral position.
(b) Judicial Interpretation
While the legislation itself is problematic, judicial interpretation
has begun to express a much more desirable approach. Specifically,
the courts are effecting a shift away from the concept of undue exploi-
tation of sex towards an analysis informed by an understanding of
sexual exploitation. This has been achieved by linking undue sexual
exploitation with the feminist discourse of degradation and dehumani-
zation. Moreover, a move towards a feminist methodology is occur-
ring on two levels. The representations themselves are screened for
the manner in which the participants are portrayed. As well, some
recent judgments have acknowledged the threat to women's equality
posed by certain types of depictions. Nonetheless, such a move has
only transpired within the past four years. It may, therefore, be helpful
to provide a brief summary of the prior judicial interpretation of the
obscenity provisions.
The first leg of section 159(8) contains a prohibition against the
undue exploitation of sex. The requirement of "undueness" has given
rise to the so-called "community standards of tolerance test," under
which the Court is required to assess whether a publication has ex-
ceeded the accepted standards of tolerance in the contemporary Cana-
dian community."4 The standard is a national one,' 's and this will vary
1986 during the First Session of the 33rd Parliament. While the Bill utilized the
concepts of pornography and degradation, it did not depart from the tradition
of formal neutrality.
113 See K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1985), p. 7, where it is argued that "the placement of an aspect of life inside or
outside the law is a form of [state] regulation."
114 Brodie v. R., supra, note 106, and R. v. Dom. News & Gifts Ltd., [1964] S.C.R.
251, 42 C.R. 209, [1964] 3 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.). The standard would thus appear
to be objective. The majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
recent case of Towne Cinema Theatres v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494, [198514 W.W.R.
1, 37 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289, 45 C.R. (3d) 1, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 18 D.L.R. (4th)
1, 59 N.R. 101, 61 A.R. 35, affirmed that the issue here is one of tolerance not
taste. "What matters is what Canadians would not abide other Canadians seeing
because it would be beyond the contemporary Canadian standard of tolerance
to allow them to see it:" per Dickson C.J.C. at p. 17 (C.R.).
115 See Freedman J.A.'s dissent in R. v. Dom. News & Gifts Ltd., 40 C.R. 109, 42
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according to "contemporary standards, reflecting the current level of
candour, with regard to sexual matters, not the level of the past."1
6
However, in light of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R.," 7 it may well be that the community
standards will-no longer be the sole test applied in assessing whether
sexual exploitation is "undue" for the purposes of section 159(8).
Of the seven-member panel who heard the Towne Cinema appeal,
two concurred in the opinion of Dickson C.J.C. In the course of his
decision, the Chief Justice enunciates three tests for establishing "un-
dueness"."" The first is that of "internal necessities", 11 9 which will
prevent a finding of undue exploitation
if there is no more emphasis. . than is required in the serious treatment of
a theme ... with honesty and uprightness .... [Tihe serious-minded au-
thor must have freedom in the production of a work of genuine artistic and
literary merit and the quality of the work ... must have real relevance in
determining not only a dominant characteristic but also whether there is
undue exploitation.110
The second test is that of community standards of tolerance, outlined
above. Last, but very significantly, Dickson C.J.C. adopts a test that
might be termed one of "degrading publications".,12 There is, how-
ever, no clear majority on the issue of whether the community stan-
dards of tolerance test is the only test ofundueness. 122Moreover, while
it is now clear that the audience to whom material is shown is irrelev-
ant in assessing the obscenity of depictions and that expert evidence
need not be led to establish community standards, it remains unclear
what evidence, if any, must be adduced. 12
W.W.R. 65, [19631 2 C.C.C. 103 (Man. C.A.), approved on appeal to S.C.C.,
supra, note 114.
116 Per Dickson C.I.C. in Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R., supra, note 114.
117 Supra. note 114.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., p. 13 (C.R.).
120 Ibid.
121 For the phrase, see Beverly Baines' annotation to Towne Cinemas Ltd. v. R.,
supra, note 114 at p. 4 (C.R.).
122 Ibid. The position adopted by Beetz, McIntyre, and Estey JJ. is unclear given
that they simply state "the standard we seek is that of tolerance" (Towne
Cinemas, supra, note 114 at p. 25 (C.R.). On the other hand, Wilson J. appears
to adopt the position that community standards must be used to assess undue-
ness.
123 Supra, note 121 at p. 4 (C.R.).
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In any event, given the prior dominance of the community stan-
dards test, not surprisingly, the obscenity provisions at least histori-
cally were less likely to countenance sexual depictions outside the
sanctioned contexts of heterosexual, marital sex. 2 4 Moreover, in an
age of increased public acceptance of displays of sexuality, pornog-
raphic depictions have become increasingly explicit, dehumanizing
and violent.' 5 The community standards of tolerance test has largely
been applied in a liberal fashion so as to license the proliferation of
pornographic materials. One need only take a trip to any newsstand
to be aware that the liberal nature ofjudicial application of the obscen-
ity provisions results in few pornographic materials being declared
obscene. On occasion, the test has become circuitous, in that evidence
of availability of the materials on the market has become indicative
of tolerance. 
2 6
124 See, e.g., Popert v. R. (1981), 19 C.R. (3d) 393, 58 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (Ont. C.A.),
affirming (1980), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (sub nom. R. v. Pink Triangle Press (Ont.
Co. Ct.).
125 It is clear that the proliferation of explicit genital shots, sado-masochistic mater-
ials, and materials containing sexual depictions of children are of comparatively
recent origin. In my view, forms of patriarchal power are changing. As women
gain increasing admission and acceptance within the public sphere, there is a
corresponding increase in the need for men to retain control within the domestic
sphere. Control is focussed on women's sexuality. This reinforces the argument
of C. MacKinnon, infra, note 166, who argues that sexuality is the linchpin of
women's oppression. Thus, the patriarchy attempts to maintain control by pr-
ducing more pornographic materials to construct women's sexuality and, at the
same time, increasingly to vilify women.
126 See, e.g., the remarks of Freedman J.A. in Dom. News & Gifis Ltd. v. R., supra,
note 115, at pp. 126-127 (C.R.):
"In this area of the law one must be especially vigilant against erecting per-
sonal tastes or prejudices into legal principles. Many persons quite evidently
desire to read these magazines, even though I do not. I recognize, of course,
that the mere numerical support which a publication is able to attract is not
determinative of the issue whether it is obscene or not. Let a publication be
sufficiently pornographic and it will be bound to appeal, in the hundreds of
thousands, to the prurient, the lascivious, the ignorant, the simple, or even
the merely curious. Admitting, therefore, that a large readership is not the test, I
must yet add that it is not always an entirely irrelevant factor. For it may have to be
taken into account when one seeks to ascertain or identify the standards of the commu-
nity in these matters. Those standards are not set by those of lowest taste or
interest. Nor are they set exclusively by those of rigid, austere, conservative,
or puritan taste and habit of mind. Something approaching a general average
of community thinking and feeling has to be discovered." [emphasis added]
See also K. Mahoney, supra, note 96 at pp. 63-70.
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The second possibility, the so-called "sex-plus" provisions, have
rarely been invoked.12 In reality, the courts have focussed on the de-
gree of graphicness of the representations. The exploitation of sex
standard has, therefore, come to mean an "undue" degree of sexual
explicitness. 12
There is, however, recent evidence of a judicial awareness of the
limitations of a sex-blind approach to the area and an appreciation of
the merits of what might be termed a gender-sensitive approach in
obscenity cases. Thus in R. v. Wagner, 29 Shannon J. of the Alberta
Queen's Bench noted that there can be undue sexual exploitation
where the participants are portrayed in a degrading or dehumanizing
fashion. I The Wagner decision accepts the classification of pornog-
raphic materials into three types:'31
(a) sexually explicit with violence;
(b) sexually explicit without violence, but dehumanizing or degrading; and
(c) explicit erotica." 2
Pornographic material classified under (a) or (b) is beyond the stan-
dards of tolerance in contemporary Canadian society. Mr. Justice
Shannon's comments on the second category reflect an understanding
of the harm women perceive in pornography:
In sexually explicit pornography that is free of violence, but is degrading
or dehumanizing, men and women are often verbally abused and portrayed
as having animal characteristics. Women, particularly, are deprived of unique
127 See K. Mahoney, supra, note 96 at pp. 57-63.
128 Ibid.
129 (1985), 43 C.R. (3d) 319, 36 Alta. L.R. (2d) 301 (Alta. Q.B.).
130 The Wagner decision is but one in a line of decisions in which judges have
adopted the feminist discourse of degradation and dehumanization. In R. v.
Doug Rankine Co. (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 154 at 173, 9 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont. Co.
Ct.), Borins Co. Ct. J. held that the community standards of tolerance would
be exceeded by "films which consist substantially or partially of scenes which
portray violence and cruelty in conjunction with sex, particularly where the
performance of indignities degrades or dehumanizes the people upon whom
they are performed." A similar approach was also adopted by Ferg J. in R. v.
Ramsingh (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 230, 29 Man. R. (2d) 110 (Man. Q.B.), and
Harrison Prov. J. in R. v. Chin, unreported, February 22, 1983 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
131 R. v. Wagner, supra, note 129 at pp. 331 (C.R.).
132 Mr. Justice Shannon defines sexually explicit erotica as portraying "positive and
affectionate human sexual interaction, between consenting individuals par-
ticipating on a basis of equality."
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human character or identity and are depicted as sexual playthings, hysterically
and instantly responsive to male sexual demands. They worship male genitals
and their own value depends upon the quality of their genitals and breasts.",
A similar approach is adopted in R. v. Red Hot Video Ltd.,13 4 where
Nemetz C.J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal notes that the
"degrading vilification of women is unacceptable by any reasonable
Canadian community standard."' 35 Anderson J. in the same decision
also is attentive to the fact that pornographic images "exalt the con-
cept that in some perverted way domination of women by men is
accepted in our society.""' 6 Moreover, he also notes that "[ijf true
equality between male and female persons is to be achieved it would
be quite wrong ... to ignore the threat to equality resulting from the
exposure to male audiences of the violent and degrading material",
given that "such material has a tendency to make men more tolerant
of violence to women and creates a social climate encouraging men
to act in a callous and discriminatory way towards women."' 37 Signifi-
cantly, in support of his contention that section 159(1) constitutes a
"reasonable limit" under section 1 of the Charter on the section 2(b)
Charter right to freedom of expression, Mr. Justice Anderson stresses
that what constitutes a reasonable limit cannot be determined in isola-
tion. Section I must be read in light of the Charter provisions in their
entirety. In particular, Anderson J.A. focuses on section 28 of the Char-
ter, which guarantees protection of Charter rights equally to male and
female persons. 3s Thus, section 159(8) constitutes a reasonable limit
on freedom of expression, and this is demonstrably justifiable in light
of the need to ensure the equal worth and dignity of women. Presum-
ably, this argument is now of even greater import given that section
15 of the Charter was not in force at the time the judgment in Red Hot
Video was rendered. 9
Less direct support for a gender-sensitive approach to obscenity
cases can also be gleaned from the Towne Cinema decision. In his judg-
133 R. v. Wagner, note 129 at p. 331(C.R.)
134 (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 36, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 15 C.R.R. 206 (B.C.C.A.).
135 Ibid., p. 43 (C.R.).,
136 Ibid., p. 59 (C.R.).
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., p. 66 (C.R.).
139 The judgment was handed down on March 18, 1985, almost a month before s.
15 of the Charter (the equality provisions) came into force on April 17, 1985.
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ment, Chief Justice Dickson cites the Rankine,'40 Wagner and Chin'4'
decisions with approval, finding that "publications which portray per-
sons in a degrading manner as objects of violence, cruelty or other
forms of dehumanizing treatment may be 'undue' for the purpose of
s. 159(8). "142 Thus, notwithstanding that certain types of material fall
within community standards of tolerance, they may nonetheless be
"undue" within the meaning outlined above. 143 Unfortunately, it
would appear that Dickson CJ.C. intended to limit the applicability
of the degradation standard to one of three tests of undueness.' 4' The
judgments given by BeetzJ. (EsteyJ. concurring) and McIntyre J. do
not address this issue. Madam Justice Wilson's opinion has the merit
of injecting this standard into all assessments of whether materials are
obscene within the wording of section 159(8). 14 In the end result,
while a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada endorses the adop-
tion of feminist criteria, albeit articulated in different forms' 46 and
seemingly for disparate purposes, the exact circumstances in which
they are to be applied await further judicial clarification.
47
I have argued elsewhere "I that this judicial trend is significant in
140 Supra, note 130.
141 Ibid.
142 Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R., supra, note 114 at p. 14 (C.R.).
143 Ibid., p. 15 (C.R.).
144 As noted out by Beverly Baines in her annotation to the decision, supra, note
121, these comments are made in the context of establishing that community
standards of tolerance are not the sole test of undueness. Dickson C.J.C.'s com-
ments about degrading publications appears to form only a separate alternative
category of "undue" sexual representations. From Dickson's judgment it is un-
clear which of the three tests of undueness is applicable in any given case.
145 Towne Cinema, supra, note 114 at p. 29 (C.R.). She states:
"It seems to me that the undue exploitation of sex at which s. 159(8) is aimed
is the treatment of sex which in some fundamental way dehumanizes the persons
portrayed and, as a consequence, the viewers themselves. There is nothing
wrong in the treatment of sex per se but there may be something wrong in the
manner of its treatment. It may be presented brutally, salaciously and in a de-
grading manner, and would thus be dehumanizing and intolerable not only to
the individuals or groups who are victimized by it but to society at large."
146 It would seem that the concept with which the ChiefJustice is principally con-
cerned is that of degradation, while the paramount consideration for Madam
Justice Wilson is that of dehumanization.
147 See B. Baines, supra, note 121 at p. 4.
148 See S. Noonan, Annotation to R. v. Wagner (1985), 43 C.R. (3d) 319; S. tNoonan,
"Preferring the Feminist Approach of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
That of the Fraser Committee" (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 61.
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that the cases adopt, in varying degrees, the feminist discourse of de-
gradation, dehumanization, and objectification. Moreover, the courts,
insofar as they move away from treating sexual explicitness as deter-
mining the issue of undue exploitation of sex, are adopting more of
a feminist position in that sexual representations are contextualized.
Such a shift more clearly aligns the existing obscenity provisions with
a feminist position on pornography, and is arguably responsible to the
nature of the harm threatened by pornographic depictions. Further-
more, there is some judicial support for permitting erotic materials to
be disseminated without legal sanction, in particular, the Wagner deci-
sion.' 49 Finally, by focussing on the implications of particular forms
of representation for women's equality, a concept approaching sexual
exploitation becomes the substantive test for obscenity.
(c) Pornography and Equality
Insofar as legislation and the Courts fail to take the exploitation
of women into account, the law legitimates the status quo and an at-
mosphere that is antithetical to the achievement of sexual equality.
Thus, by failing to recognize the implications of pornography's mes-
sage and to grapple with it, the law both reinforces and facilitates
women's subordination. Neutrality and morality, objectivity and
good and evil, have been the legal tools through which women's real-
ity has been masked.'50
What approach to pornography, then, might substantive equality,
i.e., equality of outcome, or condition, demand? What strategy ought
to be adopted to combat the inequality that pornographic images per-
149 Supra, note 129. This approach also seems to be favored by Madam Justice Wil-
son, who stated at p. 29 (C.R.) of her judgment in Towne Cinema, supra, note 114:
"[Sex] ... may be presented in a way which harms no one, in that it depicts
nothing more than non-violent sexual activity in a manner which neither de-
grades nor dehumanizes any particular individuals or groups. It is this line be-
tween the mere portrayal of human sexual acts and the dehumanization of people
that must be reflected in the definition of 'undueness'."
However, whether there is such a category of "erotic" materials, which in fact
"harm no one," has been recently questioned. See C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral
Issue," supra, note 96 and G. Finn, Against Sexual Imagery: Alternative or Other-
wise, paper prepared for the Symposium on Images of Sexuality in art and the
media presented by Gallery 101, Ottawa, March 13-16,1985.
150 C. MacKinnon, infra, note 167.
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petuate? In short, how is a balance between sexual freedom and social
control to be struck? 51 The questions to be addressed are pressing
ones, for the voices of women are beginning to be heard. A feminist
analysis has created an impact in both adjudication and proposals for
legislative reform.5 2 The following discussion, rather than purporting
to endorse either value, seeks to explore the relative strengths and limi-
tations of two paradigms, namely sexual freedom and social control
and to see how they would assist in the pursuit of substantive sexual
equality."5 3
Embracing sexual freedom by adopting a position seeking mini-
mal state regulation of sexual depictions would admit of the greatest
potential to develop and explore a feminist erotica, or alternative im-
ages of women's sexuality that are potentially positive and liberative.
By not invoking the protection of the law, there is less danger of the
law being used to suppress women's views, or to prohibit representa-
tions of female sexuality that threaten the existing sexual order, such
as lesbian sexual depictions.
Moreover, affirming sexual freedom allows clarity of political
position.' 4 Unlike the New Right, the feminist movement is not seek-
ing to delegitimate sexual desire per se.' ss Often that movement, in
taking an antipornography stand, has found itself aligned with mem-
bers of the moral majority, or other groups who seek to privatize
sex. 1 6 Vigilance is necessary to ensure that sex is not simply relegated
to the private realm, in which women's oppression has long taken
place in silence and isolation. The feminist attack on pornography is
but part of a larger political campaign against current constructions
of sexuality, with the concomitant distributions of power and the im-
plications those constructions have for women's subordination.
But, would the development of a feminist erotica promote the
151 See F. Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis" (1984),
63 Tex. L. Rev. 387; Zillah Eisenstein, Feminism and Sexual Equality (N.Y.:
Monthly Review Press, 1984).
152 The recent Fraser Report expressly canvassed and included feminist perspectives
on pornography. Moreover, it acknowledged that the availability of pornog-
raphic materials undermines women's struggle for sexual equality. Unfortu-
nately, however, within the typical liberal paradigm, while it sought to hear,
and not suppress, the feminist viewpoint, these perspectives seem to have had
little impact on the ultimate recommendation for reform of the criminal law.
153 Z. Eisenstein, supra, note 151.
154 Ibid., pp. 246-254.
155 F. Olsen, supra, note 151 at p. 431.
156 See Z. Eisenstein, supra, note 151 at p. 251.
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achievement of substantive sexual equality? Would it help to equalize
the social conditions of women and men? If we accept that the ideol-
ogy of pornography affects the social position of women, then logi-
cally, if there is a distinction between pornography and erotica, it
seems tenable to suggest that the development of sexual images pro-
duced by women for women might also have an effect. This is not
to suggest that, given the current control of the mass media and the
fact that patriarchal sexual representations serve to reinforce existing
male hegemony, recognition of this idea corresponds to a belief in the
liberal "marketplace of ideas.' 5 7 Rather, in principle it might be ar-
gued that permitting women to have a voice in the meaning of what
it is to be female would seem at least to be a step towards empowering
women. 
5 8
However, we should at least ask ourselves MacKinnon's question:
Given the present circumstances of gender inequality "what is eroti-
cism as distinct from the subordination of women?"'5 9 Has eroticism
become inextricably fused with dominance and submission and with
expressions of power and powerlessness such that representations of
heterosexual intercourse are by definition depictions of unconsensual
sex? Has our ability to imagine a different world been so constrained
by the structures' 16 of inequality thrust upon us and legitimated by
every level of the superstructure, (the oppression, of course, is at least
equally present within the domestic sphere), that we cannot yet dream
except in specious ideologies? Last, we should carefully examine the
question of whether sexual representations may by definition repro-
duce a male epistemology, and hence reinforce patriarchal power.16'
Even accepting the dangers implied by these questions, however, few
would advocate the elimination of all forins of sexual depiction. In-
deed, even if such a move were proposed, some form of sexuality
would remain.
157 This is a notion that truth and good will prevail if only we can permit men to
see it. Moreover, as a strategy for the achievement of substantive sexual equality,
merely promoting sexual freedom seems, at best, naive. We cannot ignore the
lessons of history, which tell us that in reality sexual freedom turns out to be
freedom for men to exploit women.
158 See, for example, Z. Eisenstein, supra, note 151, who argues that sexual equality
requires this sexual freedom for women.
159 "Not a Moral Issue," supra, note 96 at p. 343.
160 Ibid.
161 See G. Finn, supra, note 149.
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Given that a critique of sexuality may be central to feminist
theory,16 2 and correspondingly the deconstruction of it a fundamental
political strategy, it is important that women reconstruct concepts of
sexuality.163 Therefore, it would seem that despite the differences in
strategy, a minimalist resolution of these conflicting positions on por-
nography can be forged. This is that the law can assist women by
censuring'6 images that legitimate their subordination.
By electing for some degree of social control, protection may be
gained from images of women that reinforce prevailing patriarchal
ideology.66 However, we must ensure that any rules formulated will
be efficacious in redressing pornography's discriminatory effects. This
must be designed to be sensitive to the images of women that pornog-
raphy reproduces. '"Moreover, the older judicial discourse of morality
must be rejected as it seeks to delegitimate sexual desire without re-
gard to whether particular types of sexual depiction contribute to the
continued subordination of women.
Beyond that, the commitment to equality requires a considera-
tion of what form of legal redress will best empower women, irrespec-
tive of their economic position, to curtail effectively the production
and distribution of pornographic material. Is the civil law, or the crim-
inal law, or some combination of both the best vehicle for legal
change?
Finally, social control must be embraced cautiously given that the
legal system has often been complicitous in women's subordination
and given that laws are still applied largely by men. It would seem
that the risk that laws will only serve to further the needs of the pat-
riarchy may best be offset by an attempt to formulate laws that adopt
both a feminist discourse and a feminist methodology.' 67 Even if this
162 See C. MacKinnon, ihfra, note 167.
163 See F. Olsen, supra, note 151, and F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1982-83), 96 Harv. L.R. 1497.
164 C. Sumner, "Rethinking Deviance: Toward a Sociology of Censures" in Re-
search in the Sociology of Law and Deiatce, S. Spitzer, ed., Vol. 5, (Connecticut:
JAI Press. 1984).
165 See Z. Eisenstein, supra, note 151.
166 See C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue, " supra, note 96 at p. 335.
167 See C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983), 8 Signs 635; D. Polan, "Toward a Theory of
Law and Patriarchy", in The Politics of Law, D. Kairys, ed., (New York: Panth-
eon Books, 1982); J. Rifkin, "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy" (1980),
3 Harv. Women's L.J. 83. •
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were to be achieved legislatively, it furnishes no guarantee that in its
application the law will not be twisted and used against women.
Moreover, at the risk of being trite, legal reform is in and of itself no
panacea for ubiquitous social inequality.
My own vision for a new world free from sexual inequality
would demand both sexual freedom and social control for its achieve-
ment. Challenging prevailing images by fostering new conceptions of
sexuality that celebrate desire may pave the way for alternative con-
structions of gender. At the very least, such a move would serve to
empower women by presenting them with a choice of ways in which
to conceive of, and thereby express, explore and evolve their own
sexuality. Moreover, the censure of certain sexual images that facilitate
the continued subordination of women may liberate popular imagina-
tions from the current structures of male thought and power. In con-
trast, gender-neutrality denies women's reality and, if adopted in for-
mulating laws to redress pornography's discriminatory effect, will be
futile in aiding our quest for true sexual equality.
4. CONCLUSION
The implications of the foregoing analysis of the criminal laws
on prostitution and pornography suggest that rejection of any a priori
attempt to push either gender-neutrality or gender-specificity as a
legislative or judicial goal is perhaps the best strategy for achieving
sexual equality. Neither tool for legal reform as an abstraction will
serve to promote women's equality in all contexts.
An attempt has been made to demonstrate that gender-specific
prostitution laws have had harmful consequences for women engaged
in that work. Moreover, it has been suggested that gender-neutral
legislation may simply drive discrimination underground.
More significantly, however, gender-neutrality may also serve to
obscure the true social problem with which legislators and judges
ought to be grappling, as seems to have been the case with our laws
on obscenity. An approach that recognizes the effect of pornography
in producing and promoting women's equality would be preferable.
In the result then, this paper is a "plea for ambivalence"'168 in con-
168 As suggested by Professor Kathleen Lahey at the conference entitled Politics of
Pornography: Politics of Prostitution, sponsored by The Ontario Public Interest Re-
search Group, Toronto, November, 1985.
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ceiving of equality. Rather than clinging either to gender-specificity
or gender-neutrality as rigid goals for legal reform, women's actual
inequality must be acknowledged. In this context, legislators and ad-
judicators should ask whether a given law adds to the overall subordi-
nation of women when assessing whether or not it infringes section
15 of the Charter. If section 15 is not to become a hollow victory for
Canadian women, we must reject blind adherence to the principle of
formal equality in favour of a flexible, contextualized approach.

